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One logic or many? I say—many. Or rather, I say there is one logic for each way
of specifying the class of all possible circumstances, or models, i.e., all ways of
interpreting a given language. But because there is no unique way of doing this, I
say there is no unique logic except in a relative sense. Indeed, given any two
competing logical theories T1 and T2 (in the same language) one could always
consider their common core, T, and settle on that theory. So, given any language
L, one could settle on the minimal logic T0 corresponding to the common core
shared by all competitors. That would be a way of resisting relativism, as long as
one is willing to redraw the bounds of logic accordingly. However, such a mini-
mal theory T0 may be empty if the syntax of L contains no special ingredients
the interpretation of which is independent of the specification of the relevant L-
models. And generally —I argue— this is indeed the case.
1. From Pluralism to Relativism
The view that I hold stems from the familiar semantic conception of logic, ac-
cording to which
(1) A valid argument is one whose conclusion is true in every model in
which all its premises are true.
As JC Beall and Greg Restall have recently argued,1 this definition is by itself
relativistic insofar as the notion of ‘model’ may be cashed out in different
ways. Take models to be worlds (or world-like structures) and (1) yields some
sort of classical logic. Take models to be situation-theoretic set-ups (possibly
incomplete and/or inconsistent) and (1) results in some sort of relevant logic.
Thus, the question “Is this argument valid?” does not admit of a unique answer
because there is more than one sense in which an argument can be valid, and to
                                                
1 In Beall and Restall [2000].
2the extent that these senses are equally good one would be entitled to hold a rela-
tivistic position.
This sort of consideration could leave one unmoved. Ambiguity is no evi-
dence for relativism if disambiguation stamps out all disagreement. In fact, Beall
and Restall prefer to speak of ‘pluralism’ rather than ‘relativism’, and I think
their pluralism is best interpreted as the moderate claim that there are several
equally good, non-equivalent ways of reading (1), i.e., several equally good
senses of construing the relevant notion of a model, regardless of whether these
senses leave room for internal disagreement. The view that I intend to outline,
and that provides evidence for a more recalcitrant brand of relativism, is stronger.
I hold that there exist ways of reading (1) that do leave room for internal dis-
agreement. They leave room for disagreement because they are compatible with
different ways of characterizing that portion of the language that is responsible
for the required nexus between the premises and the conclusion of a valid argu-
ment—different ways of characterizing the “logical vocabulary”. And these
ways of reading (1) need not be idiosyncratic. They can be as ordinary as one
likes, provided that we do away with a number of misleading traits that we are
accustomed to associate with our favorite notion of a model.
Ultimately, of course, even this sort of disagreement could be construed as a
form of ambiguity: it is still ambiguity on the relevant notion of a model. Sup-
pose we disagree on whether the identity predicate should be treated as a logical
constant. You say that it should be so treated, and therefore you exclude from
the range of admissible models anything that doesn’t do justice to the intended
interpretation of this predicate. I say that the identity predicate should not be
treated as a logical constant, and therefore regard as admissible even models that
reflect a different interpretation. Here ‘model’ could be construed in the ordinary
fashion, assuming the language to be some familiar sort of first-order language. So
our disagreement concerns the exact composition of the class of first-order mod-
els: You say it should only include certain models, I say it should not. And
surely we could blame it on semantic ambiguity. We could say that we are not
using the same notion of a first-order model after all. In this sense our disagree-
ment would be just as innocuous as any other divergence that trades on ambigu-
ity. However, this is only one way of looking at the impasse. Surely we could
also insist that we possess exactly the same concept and yet we disagree on its
extension: You say the extension only includes certain models and I say it in-
cludes many more. In this sense, our disagreement would not just be a sign of
ambiguity. It would be genuine and irreducible, and enough to make a difference
when it comes to the logic of arguments involving the identity predicate.
3This sort of disagreement concerning the status of identity is familiar from
logic textbooks. Is identity the only case in point? I don’t think so. On the con-
trary, I think the same sort of disagreement may apply across the board and af-
fect the status of any portion of the relevant vocabulary. Tarski once suggested
that  every term can in principle be treated as a logical term or as a non-logical
term, as the case may be,2 so the relativism ensuing from this view may be
termed Tarskian Relativism. Indeed, once Tarskian relativism is admitted a dif-
ferent sort of logical relativism must be admitted as well, according to which dif-
ferent ways of specifying the semantics of a fixed logical vocabulary are also
possible. You and I may agree that identity is a logical constant but you may
think that it stands for a transitive relation whereas I may not.3 Again, this
amounts to a genuine disagreement concerning the range of admissible models.
And, again, I see no reason to restrict the possibility of such disagreement to a
few cases: given any way of drawing the boundary around the logical vocabulary,
we may in principle disagree on the exact interpretation of any portion of that
vocabulary. Quine famously argued against this view by stigmatizing deviance:
“Change of logic, change of subject”.4 On the other hand, Carnap’s “principle of
tolerance” famously implied that everyone is at liberty to build his or her own
logical theory, even when this means casting the ship of logic off from the terra
firma of classical forms.5 So we may label this view Carnapian Relativism. It is
the relativism that comes with the claim that the meaning of the logical vocabu-
lary is up for grabs, which is not the same as the claim that the choice of the vo-
cabulary is itself up for grabs. My contention in the following is that both varie-
ties of relativism, even in their most extreme forms, are defensible.
2. Logical and Extra-logical
Let us begin with Tarskian Relativism. What are the reasons for maintaining that
the distinction between the logical and the extra-logical is up for grabs? Broadly
speaking, my reasons stem from the consideration that all bits of language get
their meaning fixed in the same way, namely, by choosing some class of models
as the only admissible ones. One notable difference, of course, is that in one case
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3 In fact I do agree that identity is transitive. But there are philosophers who have denied
it—e.g., Garrett [1985].
4 Quine [1970], Ch. 6.
5 See Carnap [1934].
4(the logical terms) the relevant class of admissible models is normally thought of
as constituting the class of all possible models, whereas in the other case the
chosen models are just meant to characterize a certain way of understanding the
terms in question—a preferred way among many possible others. In this sense,
logic is a uniquely ambitious theory. It aims to be the theory included in every
other theory; its models want to include the models of every other. Yet this no-
table difference—I argue—does not rest on any intrinsic peculiarity of the logical
terms. One can draw the line between the logical and the extra-logical vocabulary
in many ways, and depending on how one draws the line one can think of the
models that fix the meaning of the logical terms as constituting the class of all
models. Alternatively, one can specify the class of all possible models in many
different ways, and depending on how one specifies that class one can think of
the terms whose meaning is invariant across the board (in some sense to be clari-
fied) as constituting the logical vocabulary. Logic is ambitious, but precisely for
that reason the competition can be tough.
Here is how Tarski put it in his 1936 paper, “On the Concept of Logical
Consequence”:
The division of all terms of the language discussed into logical and extra-logical
. . . is certainly not quite arbitrary. If, for example, we were to include among
the extra-logical signs the implication sign, or the universal quantifier, then
our definition of the concept of consequence would lead to results which obvi-
ously contradict ordinary usage. On the other hand no objective grounds are
known to me which permit us to draw a sharp boundary between the two
groups of terms. It seems to be possible to include among logical terms some
which are usually regarded by logicians as extra-logical without running into
consequences which stand in sharp contrast to ordinary usage.6
As I mentioned, Tarski even went as far as saying that
In the extreme case we could regard all terms of the language as logical. The
concept of formal consequence would then coincide with that of material con-
sequence.7
This last statement is actually a non-sequitur, unless treating all terms as logical
is taken to imply drastic restrictions on the cardinality of the admissible models.
(Ordinarily, a statement of the form ‘There are exactly m things’ is a material
consequence of a statement of the form ‘There are exactly n things’ (n „  m) if,
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5and only if, the number of objects in the domain of quantification is either differ-
ent from n or equal to m.8) But never mind that. The relevant claim is that all (or
any) terms of the language could in principle be regarded “as logical”—and I
agree with that.
Now, what are the objections to this view? A lot has been said in this re-
gard,9 but I think the main complaints boil down to three, and none of them is
compelling. Two objections can be stated and replied to easily; the third requires
a detailed response, and the bulk of the sequel will be devoted to it.
The first objection comes with the intuition that a logical term is semanti-
cally invariant—that it is a logical constant. Take a first-order language L whose
vocabulary includes an extra-logical constant, say, the binary predicate ‘parallel
to’. As an extra-logical term, this predicate is characterized by a strong semantic
variability: its extension in an L-model can be any binary relation whatsoever,
any set of ordered pairs. Indeed, all things being equal, ‘parallel to’ is an extra-
logical predicate precisely insofar as the class of its possible extensions coincides
with that of any other extra-logical binary predicate. Can we make it into a logi-
cal term just by stipulating instead that its extension be kept constant in all L-
models? Hardly so. The only way to make the stipulation would involve drastic
restrictions on the variability of a model’s domain. For example, if R is the exten-
sion in question, we would have to rule out as inadmissible all models whose
domain contains fewer elements than the field of R, and this is hardly a way of
doing justice to the intended meaning of ‘parallel to’. So, at least cardinalitywise,
the interpretation of ‘parallel to’ must vary from model to model.
This objection, however, proves little. After all, the same consideration
would affect the status of some typical logical constants. The interpretation of
‘identical with’, for instance, depends just as much on the domain of discourse,
or on its cardinality, so strictly speaking it cannot be kept constant in all models.
Semantically, what distinguishes a logical constant is not the fact that its inter-
pretation is invariant from model to model, for sometimes its does vary. So the
fact that the interpretation of ‘parallel to’ must vary can hardly be a reason for
not including it into the logical vocabulary.
A second line of objection stems from the intuition that logicality requires
generality (as opposed to semantic invariability). True—one could argue—the
intended interpretation of a predicate such as ‘identical with’ may vary from
model to model. Nonetheless it can always be identified with the identity rela-
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6tion defined on the model’s  domain. Its intended interpretation works fine in
every domain, for all (pairs of) objects in the domain. As Quine put it, identity
knows no preferences, it treats all objects impartially.10  By contrast, the in-
tended interpretation of a predicate such as ‘parallel to’ only makes limited sense
in certain domains. (What is this predicate supposed to mean in a domain of enti-
ties that cannot be compared with regard to direction—say: properties?) So,
again, treating ‘parallel to’ as a logical term would seem to involve drastic restric-
tions on the composition of a model’s domain, and this would suffice to cash out
a significant difference between this predicate and a logical predicate such as
‘identical with’.
This objection, I think, is also inadequate. For if treating certain bits of lan-
guage as logical constants amounts to identifying a certain class of models with
the class of all possible models, then the sort of restriction at issue, though dras-
tic, would have to be expected. Models in which the parallel-to relation makes no
sense would simply have to be dismissed if ‘parallel to’ were treated as a logical
constant. On pain of begging the question, it is hard to see how the necessary
condition of generality can be violated, in this case as in many others. Moreover,
as a sufficient condition generality is dubious, too. For there are other theories
besides logic that seem to fit the bill. Formal ontology, for instance, understood
in the spirit of Husserl’s “pure theory of the objects as such”,11  is arguably a
theory of equal generality and its primitive notions (such as ‘part of’ or ‘de-
pends on’) would seem to apply across the board.
One could press the objection, here. One could argue that the difference be-
tween ‘identical with’ and ‘parallel to’ (or ‘part of’) is that the meaning of the
former can be captured by a rule that does not require distinguishing the identity
of objects in a given universe, whereas the meaning of the latter does require that.
This, in turn, could be explained in terms of invariance under permutations: no
matter how one picks a model, the extension of ‘identical with’ is not affected by
any permutation of the universe (i.e., any one-one transformation of the universe
onto itself), as all things are sure to remain self-identical no matter how one ma-
nipulates them. By contrast, a rule for ‘parallel to’ (or ‘part of’) could be so af-
fected. Ergo, only ‘identical with’ is a logical term—or so one could argue.
This way of pressing the objection has a respectable pedigree. Tarski him-
self considered the invariance criterion in a joint article with Adolf Linden-
baum, “On the Limitations of the Means of Expression of Deductive Theo-
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7ries”12  (where it is shown that every notion definable in the simple theory of
types is invariant under all permutations of any given domain) and eventually
articulated it extensively in his 1966 lecture, “What are Logical Notions?”.13  The
same idea was taken up by Mostowski and Lindström in their papers on general-
ized quantifiers14  (where the invariance property was explicitly employed to li-
cense a genuine extension of standard first-order logic) and recently refined and
defended by Gila Sher.15  Indeed, the invariance criterion is nowadays widely ac-
cepted as an extensionally adequate criterion, i.e., as a tool for correctly identi-
fying the traditional set of logical constants and some of its most natural exten-
sions. (It is precisely in this sense that Tarski was interested in the criterion, in
spite of the fundamentalist skepticism of his 1936 paper.) However, the crite-
rion is ultimately inadequate—in fact, question-begging—if our concern is what
distinguishes logical from extra-logical terms in its most general form, without
reference to any particular logical theory. For what is it that would allow us to
say whether the interpretation of a given term is always invariant under all per-
mutations of the given domain, if not a preconceived understanding of what is
logically admissible? Take again the case of predicates. The problem is not only
that we could interpret ‘identical with’ as a relation other than identity, for that
would still be compatible with the identity relation itself enjoying a special
status regardless of how we choose to designate it. Nor is the problem that many
predicates could turn out to designate the same identity relation (consider ‘x is
identical with y iff y is either white or not white’). Rather, the problem is that the
special status of the identity relation is itself dependent on a conception of the
range of admissible models. If models with self-different objects were admitted
(as someone might urge), then identity would not comply with the invariance
criterion. Conversely, if all admissible models had their domain defined by a set
of parallel lines (for instance), or by a set of lines no pair of which are parallel,
then the parallel-to relation would comply with the criterion and the predicate
‘parallel to’ could therefore be treated as a logical constant.
From a general semantic standpoint, then, I am inclined to resist the objec-
tion. Generality is hardly a better criterion for logicality than constancy of
meaning. Are there any other options? One last, important option would seem to
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criterion but is not exhausted by it. This allows her to meet certain formal objections that can be
advanced against the criterion, such as those put forward by McCarthy [1981].
8be the flat refusal of the liberal semantic standpoint that we have been presup-
posing. My reasons for maintaining that the distinction between the logical and
the extra-logical is up for grabs stem from the thought that all bits of language get
their meaning fixed in the same way, namely, by choosing some class of models
as the only admissible ones. However, one could object that only the meaning of
the extra-logical terms is fixed that way. Indeed, according to the usual way of
spelling out a semantics for a given language (most notably inspired by Tarski’s
own characterization of the semantics for first-order languages), the logical con-
stants are interpreted outside the system of models. Their meaning is not cap-
tured by the basic semantic interface relating a language with its models. Rather,
it is imposed upon it ab initio. It is characterized only indirectly through the re-
cursive definition of truth (or satisfaction). In Sher’s words
The meaning of a logical constant is not given by the definitions of particular
models but is part of the same metatheoretical machinery used to define the
entire network of models. . . . The meaning of logical constants is given by
rules external to the system.16
To this line of objection I reply that the customary way of spelling out se-
mantics is indeed significant, but also misleading. If we are not going to consider
other ways of interpreting certain symbols, then of course there is no need to do
otherwise. So, if the meaning of the logical terms is to be kept constant (in some
relevant sense) throughout the class of all models, then of course it is convenient
to pull them out of the model-theoretic machinery and not worry about them
every time we specify a model. But does this have any significance apart from
pragmatic convenience? Does this provide any ground for a principled distinc-
tion between logical and extra-logical terms? I think not. In principle, one could
certainly proceed otherwise. Provided that one works with a semantic apparatus
that is sufficiently general and unbiased to support alternative practices, one
could treat any given term outside the system of models or inside it, as the case
may be. This is sometimes a genuine option with regard to the identity predicate,
whose meaning is sometimes fixed not by a recursive clause of the form
(2) ‘a is identical with b’ is true iff Val(a) is identical with Val(b)
(where Val is a function assigning semantic values) but rather by a stipulation
about the interpretation of the predicate itself, namely a stipulation to the effect
that ‘identical with’ picks out the identity relation. This stipulation, as we
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9have seen, amounts to a constraint on the class of the admissible models. But if
this option is available for the identity predicate, then it is equally available
when it comes to other predicates that we might want to treat as logical con-
stants. If we are ready to regard a semantic rule such as (2) as a sign of logicality
for ‘identical with’, then there is no reason not to regard the analogous rule for
‘parallel to’,
(3) ‘a is parallel to b’ is true iff Val(a) is parallel to Val(b),
as a sign of logicality as well. And if we do so, what prevents us from doing the
same with all other predicate and relation terms?
This reply, of course, only works to the extent that it can be fully general-
ized. I am saying that one could treat any given term outside the system of mod-
els or inside it, as the case may be, provided that a semantic apparatus is avail-
able that is sufficiently general and unbiased to support such practices. In the
case of binary predicates the familiar Tarskian apparatus seems to be fine. But it
remains to be shown that the same sort of flexibility is available in every case,
with regard to expressions of any syntactic category, including for example the
familiar connectives and quantifiers. If only some bits of language would resist
the treatment that I am advocating, then the boundary between the logical and
the extra-logical would not be up for grabs and the prospects for a relativistic
account of logic would be undermined. Thus, in order for the reply to be success-
ful we have to delve deeper into the relevant “metateoretical machinery” and
provide evidence to the contrary. This is why I said that the third objection calls
for a detailed response, and to these details I now turn.
3. The Paradigm of Functional Application
If our aim is generality we cannot just confine ourselves to first-order languages,
as I implicitly did so far. And of course we cannot just confine ourselves to clas-
sical Tarskian models, i.e., interpretation structures defined by a non-empty do-
main of discourse along with a series of individuals, subsets, and relations based
on this domain. These are the customary structures used in model theory but
they are not general enough for our purposes. The semantic framework that we
need consider must be much broader as regards both the notion of a language and
the notion of a model.
Now, I reckon that the best suggestion in this sense is still the general the-
ory of types, or better the theory of types as filtered through the theory of cate-
gorial grammars. This is known to be utterly overgenerating from the linguist’s
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stantpoint, but it is also a theory that covers virtually every case of logical inter-
est. So let us take a closer look.
Simply put, the guiding idea is that a language typically involves expres-
sions of various types, which can be classified into two sorts: individual (or
primitive) types, and functional (or derived) types. Intuitively, the individual
types correspond to those categories of expressions whose syntactic status is
not analyzed in terms of other categories: sentences, proper names, and pre-
sumably not many others. By contrast, functional types are defined in terms of
simpler types in a way that fixes the combinatorial properties of the correspond-
ing categories: for each pair of types t and t', primitive or functional, a new de-
rived type t'/t can be formed, corresponding to the category of those functors
that combine with expressions of type t' to produce expressions of type t. Thus,
for instance, if S is the type of sentences and N the type of names, then S/S will
be the type of connectives, N/S the type of predicates, and so on. (More gener-
ally, one could consider n-adic types of the form t1  … tn/t' for each n>0, corre-
sponding to those categories of n-place functors that build expressions of type t'
out of expressions of type t1,…, tn, in that order. However, such types  can be
ignored without loss of generality, as they can always be represented by mo-
nadic types of the form t1  /(t2 /( …/(tn/t')…)).17)
Suppose, then, that we have fixed upon a sufficiently large set T of types.
For instance, we may take an infinite stock of individual types S, N, t 0,…, t n,…
and close it under the slash operation /. Then we can define languages and models
of variable complexity in a uniform way. On the one hand, a language’s expres-
sions can be specified by recursion on the basis of some type assignment to its
symbols: for each type t, the corresponding category of expressions will com-
prise all t-typed symbols (if any) plus all those expressions that can be obtained
by applying some structural operation (e.g., juxtaposition) to pairs of expres-
sions of type t'/t and t' (respectively) for some t'. In other words, a language is
essentially a triple consisting of (i) a sequence s of symbols of various types, (ii)
a structural operation g for building compound expressions, and (iii) the resulting
T-termed system of (possibly empty) categories of expressions, E, one category
for each type tÎ T. Specifically, E = (Et: tÎ T ) would be the system defined by:
(4) If si is a symbol of type t, then siÎ Et .
If xÎ Et'/t and yÎ Et', then g(x, y) Î Et .
                                                
17 T he point is due to Schönfinkel [1924] and reflects the set-theoretic isomorphism be-
tween AB1 ´  B2 ´  … Bn and (…((AB1)B2)…)Bn.
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(Some refinements would be in order to rule out certain linguistically implausible
structures, but we need not go into such minutiae here.18) On the other hand, the
notion of a model can be characterized in a perfectly symmetric way. A model
must act as a semantic lexicon: it must determine what kind of things may be as-
signed to the basic components of the given language as their semantic counter-
parts, and it must do so within the limits set by the relevant type distinctions.
Thus, a model for a language L=(s, g, E) is essentially a triple M=(d, h, I) such
that (i) d is a sequence of typed denotations, one for each symbol in s; (ii) h is a
structural operation subject to the same type restrictions as g, and (iii) I is a T-
termed system of domains, one for each category of expressions in E. More pre-
cisely, I = (It: tÎ T ) is a sequence of domains satisfying the obvious counterpart
of (4):
(5) If si is a symbol of type t, then di Î It
If xÎ It'/t and yÎ It', then h(x,y) Î It .
Granted, in actual cases a lot depends on the exact make-up of d, h, and I, but
from the present perspective the virtue of this definition is precisely that it al-
lows for the greatest flexibility. For instance, typically one would require every
functorial domain It'/t to be a set of functions ƒ: It' ®  It , so that h could truly be
identified with the corresponding operation of functional application (i.e., h(x, y)
would always yield x(y)). Models that satisfy such further requirements—call
them stratified models—are nice because they give direct expression to the
paradigm of functional application. But such requirements are nonetheless
optional.
So, broadly speaking languages and models are homomorphic structures. A
language is literally mirrored in its models.19  And this means that the semantic
bridge between languages and models—the notion of a valuation—is straightfor-
ward. For a model M=(d, h, I) is always sure to provide all the information that is
required in order to evaluate every expression of the corresponding language
                                                
18  For example, it is understood that both s and g need be one-one to avoid ambiguities:
combined with the requirement that g be well-grounded on s (i.e., that g and s have disjoint
ranges), this will secure that each expression be uniquely defined as either a symbol or a com-
pound of the form g(x,  y). Moreover, we may want to require that all functional expressions can-
cel to individual expressions (in the sense that Et'/t ¹  Æ  always implies that Et' ¹  Æ , hence Et ¹  Æ ),
or that g be the operation of concatenation (so that g(x,  y) is always the string xy). For a full
treatment I refer to Varzi [1999], Ch. 1.
19  At least, things are ideally so. I shall come back shortly to the possibility that such
mirroring fails to yield a full homomorphism.
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L=(s, g, E): the denotation function d assigns a value to each basic expression and
the structural operation h says how to compute the value of a compound expres-
sion given the values of its components. In other words, the valuation of a lan-
guage L on a model M is the unique homomorphism between L and M induced by
d, i.e., that function Val: E ®  I such that, in general:
(6) Val(si)=di.
Val(g(x, y)) = h(Val(x), Val( y)).
Broadly speaking, then, it is a general semantic framework of this sort that I
think should be considered when it comes to assessing the claims of Section 2.
And surely enough, a framework of this sort is compatible with most natural
readings of (1). If every model of a given language were admitted, that language
would not have any logical terms, i.e., any terms whose meaning is kept fixed in
the relevant sense, and nothing guarantees that the notion of logical validity de-
fined in (1) be non-empty. As soon as we rule out some models, though, some
expressions get a fixed interpretation and logical validities begin to accrue. The
question which may lead to serious disagreement (as opposed to mere ambigu-
ity) is precisely the question of which models should be ruled out as inadmissi-
ble. (It is understood that the selection must somehow be exhaustive. The model
class defining a logic should not just consist of an arbitrary bunch of widely dis-
parate and ill-assorted models. But this is true of all good theories. In this sense,
a logic is just as good a theory as any other, albeit a very important and arguably
more fundamental one.)
By way of illustration, let us see how this way of describing languages and
models subsumes the familiar semantics of logic textbooks, though in a much
more abstract setting. Take a typical propositional language: this can be defined
as a language L=(s, g, E) whose symbols are either sentence variables (of type S)
or connectives (of type S/S or, more generally, S/(S/(…/(S/S)…))). What exactly
such symbols are, and how exactly they combine with one another by means of
g to yield compound expressions, we need not specify unless we expressly wish
to do so. Rather let us say what a classical model is. It is not just any model M
for L. We must additionally require, first, that IS  —the domain corresponding to
the category of sentences ES  —is a two-valued set, say the set 2={0, 1} (with 0
representing falsehood and 1 representing truth). Second, and most importantly
in view of the third objection of Section 2, relative to such models we need not
define the meaning of connectives via the recursive definition of truth. Just as
connectives are characterized syntactically as symbols that combine with sen-
tences to yield sentences, their denotations are characterized semantically as op-
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erations that combine truth-values to yield truth-values. In particular, if L in-
cludes connectives for negation, ‘~’ (of type S/S), conjunction, ‘ Ù ’ (of type
S/(S/S)), etc., then M would have to satisfy the additional requirement that the
denotations of these symbols combine in a way akin to the Boolean operations
of complementation, meet, etc.:
(7) If si = ~, then di(x)=1–x for all xÎ 2,
If si = Ù , then di (x)(y)=x Ç y for all x, yÎ 2,
etc. (I am assuming for simplicity that M is stratified and that numbers are sets,
so that 0= Æ  and 1={ Æ }.) It is easy to see that relative to models satisfying
these specific conditions, the resulting valuation (homomorphism) would yield
the usual results, i.e., the semantic conditions of classical bivalent propositional
logic:
(8) Val(~f ) = 1 iff Val( f )=0.
Val( f  Ù y ) = 1 iff Val( f )=Val( y )=1.
So, in particular, the notion of validity defined in (1) would yield exactly the
valid arguments of classical propositional logic. From this point of view, we are
just doing standard semantics. But note the level of abstraction (and the conse-
quent degree of generality). Here not only the domain of individuals, but every
domain of every category is specified by the model; not only the “extra-logical”
terms but all symbols, including the connectives, are interpreted inside the mod-
els. And this is exactly what is needed to provide a reply to the third objection
of Section 2. This is the sort of treatment that provides support to the claim that
the boundary between the logical and the extra-logical is up for grabs—hence
support for what I have called Tarskian Relativism—in spite of certain custom-
ary practices that suggest otherwise. We can regard any symbols of the language
as logical because there is no external constraint on the interpretation of any
symbol.
It should also be obvious how this picture supports relativism of the Car-
napian variety, at least with reference to propositional logic. We can consider
models with a different set of truth-values and corresponding conditions on the
interpretation of connectives and obtain, say, Kleene’s three-valued logic, or
Post’s, or Lukasiewicz’s. In fact, by the same pattern one can give a semantic ac-
count conforming to a plurality of non-classical propositional logics: all that mat-
ters is that the desired domains of interpretation and the denotation of each con-
nective be specified accordingly, by setting the relevant constraints on the ad-
missible models. The general format need not change.
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4. Extensions
We are not done, though. Truth-functional connectives are easy to handle. But
can the picture be generalized? Can we deal with every bit of logic terminology in
the same fashion?
I think we can. First of all, note that we can in a similar way account for the
semantics of intensional languages, say languages with modalities. The semantic
analysis of such languages is sometimes viewed as inducing a significant depar-
ture from that of purely extensional languages, for the meaning of a modal con-
nective is taken to depend on factors that cannot possibly be captured by a
standard model. Thus, a Kripke-style semantics for a modal language is concep-
tually more convoluted than pure Boolean semantics (though of course the un-
derlying connection can be made to emerge). By contrast, in a framework like the
one we are considering the treatment is perfectly uniform: to account for the rele-
vant factors one only has to refer to the appropriate class of models, requiring
for instance that the basic domains of interpretation associated with the primi-
tive types be not just sets of flat, unanalysed entities, but sets of functions
ranging over those entities and taking as arguments items from an appropriate set
of intensional features. Thus, if L is a propositional language with modalities, a
suitable model for L could be a model M where the domain corresponding to the
category of sentences is not the set 2 of truth-values, but the set 2W of all func-
tions mapping some set W of “possible worlds” into 2. The interpretation of ‘~’,
‘ Ù ’, and the other extensional connectives is not disturbed by this shift from
truth-values to truth-valued functions, for we can require that their denotations
be constant functions yielding the standard Boolean operations relative to every
world in W. But the shift becomes relevant as we turn to the modal connectives,
say the necessity connective ‘ ’. For the intensional character of such a connec-
tive can be accounted for precisely by requiring its denotation to be a function
whose value for a given argument at a given world (relative to h) depends on the
value of the argument at different worlds—a function whose value at that world
is true iff its argument is true at every world. For example, assuming for simplic-
ity that M is stratified, the relevant clauses would look like this:
(9) If si = ~, then di(x)(w)=1–x(w) for all xÎ 2W and wÎ W
If si = Ù , then di(x)(y)(w)=x(w) Ç y(w) for all x, yÎ 2W and wÎ W
If si = , then di(x)(w)= {x(w'): w' Î W} for all xÎ 2W and wÎ W
And these are clauses that result in a restriction of the class of admissible mod-
els. Models satisfying these clauses, we could say, determine the logic of ‘~’,
‘ Ù ’, and ‘ ’.
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I think at this point it should be clear how the issue of Tarskian Relativism
becomes emergent. To define a logic we need not work out a specific semantic
apparatus. We need not work out the logic before the semantics. All we need to
do is to provide a category for the symbols that we want to study (eventually
along with a suitable structural operation) and then specify which, among the
indefinitely many structures that give a homomorphic interpretation of the lan-
guage, are to count as “admissible” models. Clearly, this paves the way to Tar-
skian Relativism (though we could also speak of Les´niewskian Relativism, or
perhaps Ajdukiewiczian Relativism, since the theory of categorial grammars that
licenses this line of reasoning goes back to the work of Ajdukiewicz and Les´nie-
wski20). And it paves the way to Carnapian Relativism, too. For, as we have
seen, there is more than one way of selecting the models that fix the meaning of a
given logical term, and each way will deliver a different logical theory.
It is still worth stressing that this perspective is supported only to the ex-
tent that the same account can be extended to a significant plurality of logics: not
only propositional logics or kindred systems whose algebraic structure is easily
exploited, but also systems of greater complexity. In this regard, the crucial point
is that the entire framework is based on a strong principle of “functional applica-
tion”: For every model of any language, the value of the result of applying a
functor x to an argument y is always the result of applying the value of x to the
value of y. We saw that there is no other bridge between a language and its mod-
els except this simple exploitation of their structural homomorphism, and it is in
this sense that no logic is imposed on the semantics from the outside . However,
there may still be room for skepticism. The claim that no logic is imposed from
the outside is unproblematic if we consider such functors as connectives or
predicates. These are intrinsically applicative operators, and they lend them-
selves naturally to the kind of modeling illustrated above. In this regard, the stan-
dard practice of specifying the meaning of connectives through the recursive
definition of truth is really just a different way of doing the same thing. But can
this be generalized to all other operators as well? Is functional application com-
bined with some type assignment all we need to set up the space of all possible
interpretation structures?
One need not look far to see linguistic structures that seem to run afoul of
the functor/argument scheme. A familiar example is provided by languages with
variable-binding operators such as the quantifiers (either standard or generalized).
Ajdukiewicz himself concluded his seminal paper on “Syntactic Connexion”
                                                
20 See Les´niewski [1929] and Ajdukiewicz [1935].
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with some remarks to the effect that such operators are not (and cannot be
treated as) genuine functors, and consequently that languages involving them re-
quire at least an additional “circumflex” operation (essentially a form of l -ab-
straction). In fact, he went as far as conjecturing that this could be the only nec-
essary departure from the paradigm of a pure categorial grammar:
Should . . . it be decided to smuggle the circumflex operator in, we would permit
ourselves the suggestion that this subterfuge might well pay, for it is possible
that all other operators . . . might be replaced by the circumflex operator and
by corresponding functors.21
This is indeed an interesting anticipation of the ideas behind Church’s l -cal-
culus;22  but of course the advantage of restricting all operators to one kind does
not diminish the theoretical importance of the departure from the pure func-
tor/argument paradigm. More generally, starting from the Sixties various authors
have argued that pure categorial grammars are essentially equivalent to context-
free phrase-structure grammars, hence subject to the same severe limitations.23
Others have argued that there is a strong connection between the principles of l -
abstraction and those transformation-like rules that seem so necessary to bring
out the relations between different levels of linguistic analysis, e.g., between
deep logical structure and surface realizations. For instance, Cresswell conjec-
tured that all “semantically significant” transformational derivations can be seen
as sequences of l -conversions.24  Also Montague grammars are typically seen in
this light.25  As a result, the question of whether a simple abstract model-the-
oretic apparatus like the one outlined above meets the requirement of generality
is commonly accorded a negative answer. In particular, l -equipped languages are
seen as a necessary extension of pure categorial languages. And since such lan-
guages are commonly given a mixed Tarskian-categorial semantics (in the sense
that the intended meaning of the l -operator is fixed during a recursive definition
of the value of an expression rather than specified directly by the models, in
analogy to the way quantifiers are dealt with in a standard Tarskian definition of
truth for first-order languages), it would seem that some logic must explicitly be
imposed on the semantic machinery from the outside, unless we confine our-
                                                
21 Ajdukiewicz [1935], p. 231.
22  Church [1941].
23 Compare Bar-Hillel et al. [1960].
24 Compare Cresswell [1977], pp. 266-67.
25  See Montague [1970]. Still another example is Henkin’s [1975] formulation of the
(simple) theory of types, which embodies abstraction and equality as the sole primitive notions.
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selves to very simple and expressively poor languages. Thus Tarskian Relativism
would fall prey of the third objection of Section 2 after all, in spite of its appar-
ent success in a number of special cases.
I reply that this is a hasty conclusion.26  Syntactically, there is no real diffi-
culty in squeezing variable-binders into the functor/argument scheme. For in-
stance, a quantifier can be treated as a symbol of type N/(S/S), i.e., as a “mixed”
functor taking names and sentences into sentences. Even better, we can simply
treat it as a kind of “structured” connective of type S/S, consisting of a quanti-
fier-marker (e.g.,‘" ’) together with a corresponding bound variable. This is not
uncommon even in standard logic textbooks.27  We would then have, for instance,
a universal quantifier ‘ " x’, a universal quantifier ‘ " y’, and so on, one for each
variable: symbols are atomic relative to the syntactic operation g, but may still
be internally structured. Let us follow this second alternative. Formally this
means that an elementary language is simply a language L =(s, g, E) with symbols
of type t/(t/(…/(t/t')…)) for t,t' Î {S, N)—i.e., sentence and name symbols (of
type S and N respectively), connectives (of type S/(S/(…/(S/S)…))), predicates
(of type N/(N/(…/(N/S)…))), and so on. Where Q is any quantifier-marker, e.g.,
the usual sign for universal quantification " , we may then assume that the name
symbols of L include a denumerable subset V so that the string Qv is a monadic
connective for each v Î V, to be thought of as the Q-quantifier binding v.
So the syntax is straightforward. The difficulty is semantic, and it is con-
ceptually tied to the above-mentioned fact that such symbols cannot be regarded
as logical terms simply by keeping their denotation constant from model to
model, for their intended meaning depends on the models’ make up. In particular,
it is obvious that quantifiers cannot be reduced to operations on truth-values,
like ordinary truth-functional connectives. However we need not do that. Truth-
values are the extensions of sentences, if we like; but quantifiers introduce an in-
tensional element—they make the value of a sentence depend on factors other
than just the truth-values of its component parts. And we just saw that this
type of dependence can easily be captured within a categorial framework. With a
modal connective the intensional shift is from truth-values to truth-valued func-
tions defined on possible worlds. With a quantifier the shift is due to a different
combination of factors, namely the various values that can be assigned to the cor-
responding bound variables. But the shift is conceptually analogous. We may
                                                
26 The facts and arguments that follow are articulated in greater detail elsewhere. See espe-
cially Varzi [1993] and [1995].
27  See e.g. Enderton [1972].
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accordingly define a model for a language with quantifiers simply by requiring
that the domains of interpretation consist of functions defined on the set of such
value-assignments. More precisely, where U is any non-empty set, we obtain a









. Then it is easy to spell out the rest of the semantics. If M is stratified,
for example, the interpretation conditions of classical logic are as follows:
(10) If si Ï V, then di is constant, i.e., di(a)=di(b) for all a,bÎ UV.
If si Î V, then di is i-variable, i.e., di(a)=a(si ) for all aÎ UV.
If si = ~, then di(x)(a)=1–x(a) for all xÎ IS and aÎ UV.
If si = Ù , then di(x)(y)(a)= x(a) Ç y(a) for all x, yÎ IS and aÎ UV.
If si = " v, then di(x)(a)= {x(a[vu]): uÎ U} for all xÎ IS and aÎ UV.
(In the last clause, a[vu] is the function that is exactly like a except that its value
at v is u 28 .)
Of course, if we have both quantifiers and modalities, we need both possi-
ble worlds and value-assignments. The generalization is obvious. Moreover, the
same treatment can be applied to provide an account of any type of variable
binding operator, including the l -operator. Variable-binders are intensional op-
erators, and intensional operators admit of a natural (albeit perhaps not obvi-
ous) treatment within the functor/argument scheme.29  The details are in the ap-
pendix. So here is my conclusion. In spite of the appearances, and in spite of
Ajdukiewicz’s own misgivings, the basic machinery outlined above does allow us
to treat the semantics of every bit of language in the same fashion, as something
to be handled within the system of models rather than via rules outside it. And in
this sense the third objection of Section 2 is fully discarded.
5. Generalizations
This concludes the technical point, which together with the our discussion of
Section 2 should establish the claim that the distinction between logical and ex-
                                                
28 It is understood that the values of functional application should not depend on value-
assignments unless the arguments do, i.e., one should have x(y)(ai )=x(y)(aj ) whenever x(ai )=x(aj )
and y(ai )=y(aj). Also, such values should behave coherently, so that xi (y)(a)=xj (y)(a) if xi (a)=xj
(a), and x(yi )(a)=x(yj )(a) if yi (a)=yj (a).
29 To my knowledge, the intensional character of variable-binders was first pointed out in
Lewis [1970], though the 1986 Postscript marks a change of view recommending to treat vari-
able-binding outside the categorial framework, in the spirit of Cresswell [1973].
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tra-logical terms is ultimately ungrounded, hence the claims leading to what I
have called Tarskian Relativism. It also establishes the claim leading to Carnapian
Relativism. For as we have seen, once the first sort of relativism is accepted, the
second follows. Much of this should come as no surprise if one is already famil-
iar with other ways of dealing with these matters in a uniform way. Algebraic
models, for instance, provide an analogous way of looking at things “from
above”, as it were, before deciding which logic to choose. And the generalization
of Boolean algebras to cylindric algebras is somewhat similar to the generaliza-
tion outlined above when it comes to treating quantifiers and other variable-
binders by means of pure functorial models. The approach that I have chosen is
but one available option. (This is again a sign of the pluralism implicit in (1).)
One question could still be asked at this point: Is this general semantic outlook
general enough to support a fully relativist position with regard to logic? Note
that the argument given so far is not an argument to establish relativism on in-
dependent grounds. The direction of the argument is from semantics to logic, and
much therefore depends on how one sees (1) to begin with—a starting point that
I have not even questioned here. All the same, this general outlook immediately
loads opposite views with a threat of inconsistency or circularity. In The Con-
cept of Logical Consequence,30  for instance, John Etchemendy has argued against
the adequacy of a semantic account of logical properties on the grounds that such
an account converts logical issues into substantive matters. For example, on a
semantic account, a finitist would have to rule out models with infinite universes.
Thus a finitist would be committed to the existence of some n such that the sen-
tence “there exist fewer than n objects” is a logical truth, whereas a non-finitist
would not. But a finitist and a non-finitist may well disagree on the philosophy
of mathematics while perfectly agreeing on logic. Ergo the semantic account is
inadequate.
There is no doubt that this conclusion is opposite to the one defended here.
Yet the argument can be resisted. In fact, from the present perspective the argu-
ment appears to beg the question. For to assume that the discrepancy between
the finitist and the non-finitist is not logical is to assume what is being contested.
As Manuel García-Carpintero has observed:
The finitist must disagree with our semantics. And it is far from clear that this
is not a logical disagreement. When defenders of finitism actually provide an
alternative semantics for quantifiers, it does involve logical disagreement.31
                                                
30 Etchemendy [1990].
31 García-Carpintero [1993], p. 121.
20
The general semantic outlook offered above does not provide a definite proof of
this view. It does, however, supply the background and the formal machinery re-
quired to support it.
So much for my bias towards a semantic account. This is enough to justify
a form of semantic “conventionalism” according to which the demarcation of
logic is ultimately a matter of conventions, and this in turns is enough to justify
both forms of Tarskian and Carnapian Relativism. However there is also a
stronger form of semantic conventionalism, and consequently of logical relativ-
ism, that we can now formulate. According to this stronger form, not only are
the logical symbols of a language on a par with the other symbols; not only are
the theses of a logical theory on a par with the theses of any other theory; ac-
cording to this form of relativism no principle whatsoever escapes this account,
not even the principles of the metalanguage. In other words: no specific logical
fact would be fulfilled by the class of all the models admitted by a given lan-
guage, which means that the relativism stance would be completely free from
metalogical interferences. Does our general semantic perspective support this
form of relativism, too? Is semantics really logic-free, or does it still involve hid-
den logical assumptions?
Here I have essentially two remarks to offer. First, there is no doubt that
we can still define semantic properties in such a way as to make them invariant
across models. In fact, although the notion of validity defined in (1) depends
heavily on how one draws the boundary between logical and extra-logical terms,
it doesn’t depend exclusively on that. There are arguments that turn out to be
valid even if they do not contain any logical terms whatsoever. An obvious case
in point is an argument whose conclusion is included among the premises. More
generally, consider the following extension of (1), which allows for arguments
with multiple conclusions:
(11) A set of sentences G entails a set of sentences S  (i.e., the argument
from G  to S  is valid) if and only if some member of S is true in every
model in which all members of G  are true.
Then it is easy to see that the so-called classical “structural” rules of classical
logic correspond without exception to valid argument forms (‘ ’ for ‘entails’):
(12) S   S (Reflexivity)
G È { f }  { f } È  S (Reiteration)
If S   G  and G   D  then S   D (Transitivity)
If G   S  then G È { f }  S  and G   { f } È  S (Thinning)
If G È { f }  S  and G   { f } È  S  then G   S (Cut)
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These argument forms are independent of the particular language at issue and
they are valid irrespective of any particular stipulation concerning the class of
admissible models: their validity just follows from (11). Obviously, one could
revise (11) so as to get different results, but that is not the point. The point is
that it is possible to define notions some properties of which hold regardless of
which class of models we consider, including the class of all models (for a given
language).
Now, this speaks against a fully relativist position. After all, some logic
does show up in the metalanguage. On the other hand, one can easily explain this
and similar facts in terms of metalinguistic conventions. The reason why the ar-
gument forms in (12) hold for any choice of models is that these argument forms
reflect certain facts that we are presupposing in the very definition of logical va-
lidity. On a different interpretation of, say, the universal quantifier ‘all’, or of the
notion of ‘set’ used in the definition (metalanguage), the picture might look quite
different. This does not by itself justify a fully relativist position. However, it
suggests that the position can be coherently maintained provided only that a
relativism of the Tarskian or Carnapian sort is reiterated at each level of the
metalinguistic hierarchy. (Again, I don’t mean this to be just an issue of ambigu-
ity. I mean to say that there may be genuine disagreement on the extension of
such notions.)
The second remark is more critical and relates to the question of semantic
generality. As I see it, there is no doubt that a full-blown relativism calls for fur-
ther generalizations of the basic “metatheoretical machinery”. A framework like
the one outlined here embeds the requirement that every model be homomorphic
to the corresponding language. This—as we saw—allows a uniform syntactic
and semantic analysis. But it also reflects the assumption (typical of a Tarskian
semantics) that a model must be made of well-defined, sharp-cut entities, neatly
linked to one another and to the language’s expressions in a univocal way. One
could find this to be a serious limitation in the scope of a semantic theory. There
is no a priori semantic reason to rule out the possibility that (our model-
theoretic representation of) what we talk about may involve “gaps” and/or
“gluts” of various sorts. As a matter of fact, even if we assume that the purpose
of a language’s expressions is to always pick out a definite semantic value, there
is no a priori reason to suppose that the underlying conditions will be always
completely fulfilled. Ordinary language sentences typically involve expressions
whose intended reference is only partially defined, or vaguely defined, or not de-
fined at all, and we may want to allow for such phenomena even in a formally re-
constructed language. Conversely, even if we assume that every expression is
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meant to have a unique congruous semantic value, there is in fact no guarantee
that the underlying conditions can be always consistently fulfilled. We all know,
for instance, that a sentence may turn out to be self-referential in unfavourable
circumstances, leading to such troubles as the liar paradox. For these reasons, a
more general semantic framework, where models with interpretational gaps
and/or gluts are admitted, is arguably desirable. In any case, such a generalization
appears to be a necessary prerequisite from the perspective of a full-blown rela-
tivistic position, for the exclusion of incompleteness and/or inconsistency is
surely a way of restricting the range of admissible models.
Without going into too many details, let me say that this question has both
a positive and a negative answer. The positive answer is that the semantic
framework outlined above can be generalized rather easily to cover such deviant
cases. One can allow for models in which certain categories of expressions fail to
be instantiated, or in which some symbols may lack a unique denotation (i.e., fail
to denote or have more than one denotation), or in which the result of applying
the structural operation may not always yield a definite semantic value (i.e., may
be indeterminate or overdeterminate for certain arguments). Formally all of this
involves allowing a model’s basic components d and h to be partial relations
rather than total functions, and this will introduce some complexities. Since there
exists no homomorphism between a language and an incomplete model, and since
there can be more than one homomorphism if the model is inconsistent, the se-
mantic bridge between a language and its models is no longer a straightforward
nusiness. Nevertheless it can be defined, and it can be defined without renounc-
ing to the conceptual uniformity of the initial framework. This is the positive an-
swer.
The negative answer is that this can be done, not in one, but in several non-
equivalent ways. For instance, personally I favor a supervaluationary ap-
proach.32  Roughly, this says that the value of an expression on an incomplete
and/or inconsistent model M is a function of the values that the expression takes
on the complete and consistent “sharpenings” of M. Since the sharpenings are
models that are homomorphic to the language, we can just apply there the
straightforward algorithm in (6) and then compute the function that gives the
valuation for M. The problem is that there are many candidate functions that
could do the job, and depending on which we choose we obtain different seman-
tics.33  Moreover, other approaches are possible, too. For instance, there exist
                                                
32 Along the lines of Varzi [1999]
33 I have examined some possible accounts in Varzi [1997], [2000].
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generalizations of Montague semantics in which the link between a language and
its incomplete models is given by a sort of “paramorphic” valuation function
that approximates, in some intuitive way, the behavior of the missing ho-
momorphism.34  The account can readily be imported from the original Montago-
vian framework into a purely categorial framework like the one considered
here, and it can easily be extended to cover inconsistent models as well. But it is
a different account from the supervaluationary one, and it yields considerably
different semantics. Evidently this is in contrast with the radically relativist
view: an abundance of generalizations is just as bad as a total lack, for it leaves
open the question of how to account for the resulting variety of metalogical theo-
ries.
The same applies to other generalizations that could be considered, and
which at this point I shall only mention. For instance, can we relax the type re-
strictions on the behavior of the structural relations? Can we generalize the no-
tion of a model by admitting self-applicative domains? Can we allow for dy-
namic models, i.e., models where the value of an expression can change depend-
ing on whether we evaluate it before or after other expressions? All of these are
questions that seem to introduce serious complications in the account favored
here. The account requires a logic-free semantics, but the bounds of semantics
don’t seem to be arbitrary.
So here my conclusions will be cautious. Perhaps a radical model-theoretic
relativism is really a hybrid, belonging to that category of philosophical posi-
tions that can only be consistently maintained up to a certain point . At the same
time, one could regard the request for a logic-free semantics as a plea for a general
semantic framework—a framework wherein each of a variety of semantic poli-
cies can be accommodated—and in this sense a radical relativism would be per-
fectly consistent: the same criteria would just apply to a semantic theory as they
apply to a logical theory. In other words, a radically relativist position could be
regarded as a form of Tarskian Relativism concerning semantics itself rather than
logic, or, if you prefer, as a form of meta-relativism. One could then reiterate the
account to accommodate stronger and stronger forms of relativism, corre-
sponding to higher and higher levels of analysis. This move into the territory of
metalanguage might appear suspicious and is surely debatable. Nonetheless it
seems inescapable. My suspicion is that it might actually prove decisive, at least
for a proper assessment of logical relativism from the semantic standpoint con-
sidered here.
                                                
34 See e.g. Muskens [1995].
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Appendix 35
Every mode of variable binding can be reduced to functional abstraction. So in
the end (and in general terms) the question examined in Section 4 is whether ab-
straction can be interpreted as a form of application, using models whose do-
mains of interpretation depend on a suitable package of intensional features and
value-assignments.
Some forms of abstraction are immediately captured by the treatment illus-
trated in the main text. For instance, we can enrich an elementary language L with
an abstractor l v for each variable v Î V, to be treated as a functor of type S/(N/S).
The ordinary interpretation of this functor is reflected in the reading “is some-
thing v such that”. And it is easy to verify that within the proposed framework,
this reading translates into the following direct condition on the admissible mod-
els for L:
(13) If si = l v, then di(x)(y)(a) = x(a[vy(a)]) for all xÎ IS  , yÎ IN and aÎ UV.
At least, this is the appropriate condition on the assumption that all relevant
models are stratified in the sense explained above, i.e., such that every functorial
domain It'/t is a set of functions ƒ: It' ®  It and h(x, y) always coincides with x(y).
In the general case, where we have abstractors acting on variables of any
type in expressions of any type, the account is not so straightforward. In fact it
is clear that we cannot go very far if we stick to stratified models, for the pres-
ence of functor variables prevents us from defining adequate intensional models
where each functorial domain is a set of functions of the right sort. However, we
need not do that. We only need consider models whose domains are built upon
sets of functions — and that can be done in the appropriate way to obtain the
desired result. This is a rather natural generalization, familiar from intensional
logics and Montague grammars. Here are the details.
To allow for generalized abstractors, we consider a full categorial language L
comprising a non-empty set St of symbols for all tÎ T. Each St includes a subset
Vt of variables so that the string l vt' is a symbol of type t'/(t/t' ) for all t' Î T and
all v Î Vt. Now let á Ut : tÎ T ñ  be a system of sets so that US  =2 and Ut'/t =Ut
Ut' for
all t,t' Î T and define A to be the Cartesian product á UtVt : tÎ T ñ . To obtain an
adequate model M we simply require that It =Ut
A for all tÎ T  . We can then make
sure that each l vt' be interpreted as a v-binding abstractor by requiring M to also
satisfy the following general condition:
                                                
35  This appendix draws on Varzi [1993], §4.
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(14) If si = l vt', then h(h(di , x), y)(a) = x(a[tat [vy(a)]]) for all  xÎ It' , all yÎ I t (v)
and all aÎ A
where t (v) is the type of v. Along with the obvious conditions on the inter-
pretation of constant and variable symbols, it can be verified that this clause con-
forms to the usual principles of the classical l -calculus.36
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